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Abstract
Introduction Still too many deaths and injuries are a result of
road safety limitations within Europe. Road safety measures
aimed to change the road environment to reduce the risks on
driver errors and to reduce the seriousness of the effects of
driver errors are expected to increase road safety. A suitable
combination of new technologies with existing infrastructure,
or with limited improvements of it, may lead to much more
cost-effective solutions (Brookhuis et al. 2006). The In-Safety
project was aimed at determining which safety measures are
expected to be most effective and in the project also evalua-
tions were performed in pilot sites and modeling laboratories.
Methods The methodological approach for the selection
and prioritization of the initial set of safety measures is
presented and discussed, based on an accident analysis. First,
the general approach is described, then the method is pre-
sented including the definition of a scenario, how accident
statistics are used as a starting point, the generation of safety
measures, and the method of selection of safety measures.
Finally, the AHP multicriteria analysis method, involved in
the final prioritisation of the selected safety measures is pre-
sented briefly.
Results and conclusion The methodology proves to be ap-
propriate for generating and evaluating self explaining road
environment measures and forgiving measures, but safety
measures in the urban environment were underrepresented,
due to stakeholders’ preferences.
Keywords Road safety . Safety measures .Methodological
approach . ADAS . Forgiving road . Self explaining road
1 Introduction
The EU project IN-SAFETY, (FP6, 506716; 2005–2008)
was aimed to identify and evaluate intelligent, intuitive
and cost-efficient combinations of new technologies and
traditional infrastructure best practice applications. This
was intended to enhance the forgiving and selfexplanatory
character of roads. The project involved, amongst others,
assessing the potential and cost-effectiveness of combined
use of new technologies and innovative HMI concepts,
developing new simulation models, risk analysis tools, har-
monising signing and personalising information, and issuing
priority implementation scenarios.
In the project, we investigated what possibilities there are
for new combinations in infrastructure and in-vehicle sys-
tems in order to raise road safety. The reason for this, is that
the costs in terms of human suffering and economic loss as a
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result of road accidents are still considerable. Furthermore, a
major cause of accidents are human errors. Studies on
effectiveness of casualty reduction measures in Greece dem-
onstrated that the largest reduction is to be expected from
vehicle crash protection (15%), measures to prevent from
driving-while-intoxicated are second with 11%, while road
safety engineering measures are expected to result in a
reduction of 6.5%. These figures are more or less represen-
tative for Europe. Next to their relatively limited effective-
ness, road safety measures result in high costs. Therefore,
due to the high cost of such measures, infrastructure
improvements are not expected to be implemented widely
and hence contribute marginally to a major reduction of road
fatalities. However, a suitable combination of new technol-
ogies with existing infrastructure, or with limited improve-
ments of it, may lead to much more cost-effective solutions
[1]. As such, these innovative solutions may become the
catalyst towards achieving the EU goal of halving the num-
ber of road accidents in 2010 as compared to 2000.
Therefore, it is to be expected that an environment that is
self-explaining and of a forgiving nature will enhance safety,
and that this type of environment particularly combines
infrastructure and in-vehicle measures. The In-Safety proj-
ect was designed to study the opportunities for improving
the road environment in these respects to increase road
safety. The basic assumption of In-Safety was that the com-
bination of infrastructure and telematics measures can pro-
vide a more cost-efficient solution, avoiding performing
expensive infrastructure works by providing the same func-
tion through a telematics or other innovative system. In-
Safety focused especially on the cooperative systems: in
car-vehicle systems combined with infrastructural systems
A self-explaining road (SER) is designed and constructed to
evoke correct expectations from road users, eliciting proper
driving behaviour, in this way reducing the chance on driver
errors and enhancing driving comfort. A forgiving road (FOR)
is defined as a road that is designed and built in such a way as
to interfere with or block the development of driving errors and
to avoid or mitigate negative consequences of driving errors.
In the current paper, the methodology is presented which
is developed and applied for defining the priority scenarios
for devising self explaining road environments and forgiv-
ing road environments aimed at improving road safety. First,
the general approach is described, then the method is pre-
sented including the definition of a scenario, how accident
statistics are used as a starting point, the generation of safety
measures, and the method of selection of safety measures.
The safety analysis for each of the measures will be reported
elsewhere (Wiethoff et al, in prep.). Finally, the AHP multi-
criteria analysis method, involved in the final prioritisation
of the selected safety measures is presented only briefly.
This method and the application of the method on these data
is described in detail in De Brucker et al (2007).
2 Research approach
To identify and evaluate the possible measures that can
constitute a working self-explaining road and/or an effective
forgiving road environment, the following approach had
been chosen (Fig. 1).
1. First we needed to establish how to define and to select
the type of driver errors for which FOR and SER sol-
utions could work. After long discussions, it was decid-
ed to start from the observable facts (the accidents in the
available accident statistics) and then to select the type
of accidents most severe or most frequent, and then find
a valid framework to select the relevant driver errors.
The analysis of accident statistics was performed. Ger-
man accident statistics were selected, for their quality,
the availability of details on the causes, and being rep-
resentative for the EU as a whole [4]. These were then
translated in terms of 5 types of driver errors, e.g.
speeding, wrong use of the lane, etc. The project con-
sortium added one more driver error: “driving too fast
near an unexpected bend on rural roads”. Reason’s
framework of errors was chosen in order to define levels
of driver errors.
2. Second, to be able to select the best FOR and SER
solutions for each driver error, a large set of possible
solutions was generated to choose from. An extensive
number of safety measures to mitigate these driver
errors were generated for three different road types:
urban roads, rural roads and motorways. The safety
measures were associated specifically to the driver
errors and the road types. For each error type a typical
solution was defined, but in 3 technological varieties:
infrastructural measures, in-vehicle measures and com-
bined measures.
3. Third, these safety measures were evaluated on their
potential safety effects, based on literature reviews.
1. Problem analysis 
2. Generation of alternatives 
3. Generation of a set of criteria 
4. Completion of the evaluation matrix 
5. Overall evaluation of the alternatives 
6. Integration of the evaluation in the decision- 
making process 
Fig. 1 Overview of the procedure in IN-SAFETYproject for selecting
new measures to improve road safety
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4. Fourth, it was decided that the project would deal with a
limited set of solutions (as was the scope of the project).
A set of 18 most promising safety measures was selected
from the initial set, representing the self-explaining or
forgiving character of a road. The set of 18 alternatives
resulted from safety measures on 6 types of driver errors,
in 3 different technological varieties: in-vehicle, infra-
structure and combined technologies. Detailed scenarios
were designed, in order to be able to study more specif-
ically the expected safety effects,
5. Next, the potential of these measures to contribute to
road safety was further estimated, applying advanced
micro- and macro safety modelling, or literature analy-
sis of previous empirical data on experiments and pilot
studies. The estimation was performed for different road
types, driver types, vehicle types. However, there were
also a number of other (decisive) criteria. For this study,
three categories of stakeholders were identified: drivers,
the society as a whole (public authorities), and manu-
facturers. For each stakeholder, different criteria would
be prevalent. Some examples are: for drivers: user costs,
user comfort, for public authorities: overall safety, for
manufacturers: investment risk. Stakeholders’ opinion
is crucial for any of the above measures to be effective.
They may foresee difficulties in implementation. Each
stakeholder performs an evaluation of the safety mea-
sure in terms of his own objectives.
6. Since it is unlikely that all criteria are equally important
to the stakeholders, the stakeholders are assumed to
weigh each criterion. These weights were measured,
and together with the different measures and the criteria
developed by them, these are used as inputs to their own
Multi Criteria Analysis (MCA). The relative weights to
above criteria were generated to get an idea about which
measures are most likely to be successfully imple-
mented. This was done by questioning stakeholder-
representatives in a multi-criteria analysis session, using
the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) method of Saaty
[8], and applied earlier [3]. This part of the study is
reported elsewhere (de Brucker et al, in preparation).
7. Based upon these results a set of most promising meas-
ures for implementation could be considered, and the
path to implementation for each of these promising
measures should be developed. This involved an analy-
sis of stakeholder opinions regarding different promis-
ing measures in terms of stakeholder preferences and
the in case of (conflicting) differences in preferences
among stakeholders, i.e. obstructing implementation,
looking for way’s to bridge these differences.
This approach will be shown and illustrated in the current
paper. Therefore, not all the details of each step will be
shown in great detail.
3 Method
3.1 Definition of a scenario
A scenario is a key methodology element in defining the
prevailing conditions outside (and inside) the vehicle which
strongly influence the outcomes of a safety measure. Sce-
nario specification and assessment parameter definitions for
outcome effects have to be included when assessment of
safety measures are developed.
Here, a scenario is defined as a conglomerate of 5 types
of elements (conditions), defining the conditions of the
driver-vehicle system on the road in which an ADAS (Ad-
vanced Driver Assistance System) is implemented ([11]:
ADVISORS project). The five conditions are shown in
Table 1, first column.
One way of illustrating the scenario concept is shown in
Fig. 2. The components are related to each other and interact
in different ways in different cases. The ADAS implemen-
tation may have very different effects (e.g. safety effects,
effects on speed, network efficiency, environmental load)
for different scenarios. In the approach for assessment of
safety measures to promote forgiving road and self-
explaining road environments scenarios are applied to de-
fine the specific circumstances and evaluate safety measures
accordingly.
The conditions of the five above mentioned types of
elements should be filled in explicitly in order to identify
and assess the effects of a specific road safety measure.
In this study, the parameters selected are presented in
Table 1, second column.
3.2 Accident statistics
Devising the measures for forgiving road environments, as
they by definition aim at avoiding or mitigating negative
consequences of driving errors, starts with listing possible
driving errors to be supported that in turn are related to
accident statistics. The latter is important since predictions
about safety effects can only be based on supporting
Table 1 Conditions, constituting a scenario and for each condition the
parameters chosen in the current study
Conditions Parameters
1. the driver age, gender, driver type, driving experience
2. the vehicle type (light vehicle—heavy vehicle), status
3. the road infrastructure road type (urban, rural, motorway)
4. the traffic conditions density, speed
5. the environmental
conditions
weather, road surface, lighting
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(avoiding, mitigating) safetyrelated errors. Lotz et al. [5]
have made a categorisation of errors based on stages in the
cause–effect chain (Table 2).
Table 2 shows, following the CARE database [9], the
Level 1 errors to be distinguished are listed in decreasing
fatalities in Germany. Level 2 errors can be distinguished by
following the accident causes that are defined in the German
accident databases. There are very many different examples
of accident causes in Germany, the top 6 are listed in
Table 2.
For the Level 3 errors, the information processing
error types: information error, diagnostic error and per-
formance error stem from Rasmussen and Vollrath. Lev-
el 4 errors can be distinguished by different causes for
reduced psycho-physiological condition. For the
generation of alternatives, level 2 errors were taken as
a starting point. It was decided to take accident statistics
as a starting point. German accident statistics were
selected, for their quality and being representative for
the EU as a whole [4,5].
3.3 Safety measures generation
For the generation of alternatives, the following types of
technological solution can be distinguished. These solutions
are based on the type of cooperation, or absence of cooper-
ation between infrastructure and systems.
& Co-operative solutions
– Infrastructure to Vehicle (signals from the infrastructure
are sent to the vehicle: e.g. curvature of the bend)
– Vehicle to Vehicle; (signals from one vehicle to one or
more other vehicles)
– Infrastructure to Vehicle and Vehicle to Vehicle
(combination of the former two solutions)





– Only road design
Fig. 2 Defining scenarios in terms of relevant conditions
Table 2 Categorisation of errors, level 1–3 in accordance to Hacker (2005), distinction within level 3 according to Rasmussen [7] and Vollrath [10]
Error Level Description Errors




•Collision with parked vehicle
•Collision with animal
Level 2: “driving error” Action that has led to the accident. •Driving too fast in an unexpected bend on rural roads (error 1)
•Speeding (error 2)
•Wrong use of the lane (error 3)
•Violation of priority rules (error 4)
•Failure when overtaking (error 5)
•Insufficient safety distance (error 6)
Level 3: “human error” Psychological process that is basis
to the driving error.
•information error (lack of perception: e.g. having not noticed the traffic sign
while passing)
•diagnostic error (incorrect evaluation of available information)
•performance error (incorrect execution: e.g. having not found the brake pedal)
Level 4: “psycho-
physiological condition”
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As mentioned in the Introduction, the basic assumption
of In-Safety is that the combination of infrastructure and
telematics measures can provide a more cost-efficient solu-
tion as compared to a stand alone solution, therefore we
devised a way to focus especially on solutions based on
cooperative systems. For the generation of alternatives, a
matrix (see Fig. 3) was produced.
ADAS were put in one dimension of a matrix (Table 4)
on the other dimension the infrastructural measures (Table 3)
were listed. The focus is on the crossing points, on the
cooperative systems.
The following categories of Infrastructure based meas-
ures were distinguished for each error type:
& Road design
& Traffic management
For these Infrastructure based measures, we constituted a
list of existing safety measures, and linked these to road
safety functions. Please refer to Table 3.
For the ADAS functionalities, we constituted a similar
list of safety functions (Table 4). The following categories of
ADAS functionalities were distinguished:
& Longitudinal support




& Driver vehicle status monitoring
& Other
A number of measures (solutions) were generated, asso-
ciated with the six errors. As an example, the measures
focussed on “Driving too fast when approaching an unex-
pected bend on rural road” are shown in Table 5, and
“wrong use of lane” are shown in Table 6. Several possible
alternative solutions were generated for which these partic-
ular errors would cover for the safety hazard: Run-off road
or head-on accidents due to inappropriate speed in
Fig. 3 Selected scenarios arranged to the safety measures. Note that
only a selection of the rows and columns are printed to improve
readability. The characters in the cells of the table correspond with
the characters in the second columns of Tables 5 and 6. Green: error 1
solutions, red: error 3 solutions
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unexpected bends, and for the safety hazard: Accidents due
to lane departure. Then, these alternative solutions were
dedicated to particular scenarios for which the alternative
would be most suitable. The technology and communication
type is listed, and, based on literature reviews: the expected
safety level of these solutions estimated.
Table 3 Infrastructure based measures that address road safety functions
Road Safety Functions Infrastructure Type Road Safety Measures
Collision warning and avoidance Road Obstacle Free Zone
Road Median Barrier
Road Safety Barrier
Traffic Management Dynamic hazard warning (VMS)
Traffic Management Dynamic Speed—(VMS)
Longitudinal Support Road Protecting Shoulder
Road static traffic signs
Road traffic lights
Road VMS
Traffic Management Section speed management system (line or stretch control)
Lateral Support Road Lane width
Road Rumble Strips
Navigation based Road Route signing
Traffic Management Dynamic Route guidance system (VMS) RDS-TMS Radio-Data-System Traffic
Traffic Management Message Channel
Perception Enhancement Traffic Management Fog warning system (VMS)
Traffic Management Low friction warning system (VMS)
Road Reflecting road markings
Road Special street light
Driver-/Vehicle Status Monitoring
Table 4 ADAS based measures that address road safety functions
Road Safety Functions ADAS Type Road Safety Measures
Collision warning and avoidance Autonomous in-vehicle Near field collision warning or Side Obstacle detection
Autonomous in-vehicle Obstacle & Collision Avoidance
Autonomous in-vehicle Co-operative Obstacle & collision warning
Vehicle Vehicle / Vehicle Infra and Infra Vehicle Local hazard warning
Longitudinal Support Autonomous in-vehicle Co-operative Speed Alert or ISA based on traffic sign recognition
Vehicle Infra and Infra Vehicle Speed Alert or ISA based on digital map data
Autonomous in-vehicle ACC-Stop & Go
Co-operative V V ACC-Stop & Go + Foresight
Lateral Support Autonomous in-vehicle Blind Spot detection
Autonomous in-vehicle Lane change assistant
Autonomous in-vehicle Lane departure warning
Autonomous in-vehicle Co-operative Lane keeping assistant
Navigation based Vehicle Infra and Infra Vehicle Navigation system
Perception Enhancement Autonomous in-vehicle Low friction warning system (in-vehicle)
Autonomous in-vehicle Vision enhancement
Driver-/Vehicle Status Monitoring Autonomous in-vehicle Driver Monitoring
Autonomous in-vehicle Vehicle Monitoring
Several Autonomous in-vehicle In-Vehicle HMI (Displays, …)
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3.4 Evaluation of safety effects
As a method to evaluate the co-operative characteristics of the
measures developed within the project a matrix has been build
that settles the scenarios between the dimensions “in-car ve-
hicle systems” and “road side measures”. Figure 3 shows this
matrix with the selected scenarios described more detailed in
Table 5, in order to show a more clear vision of the alterna-
tives. In the matrix, in-vehicle systems were put in one di-
mension of the matrix (green colour), on the other dimension
the infrastructural measures (orange colour) were listed.
In the rows all types of ADAS functionalities are listed
that are involved in the project: Collision warning and
avoidance types, Longitudinal support, Lateral support,
Navigation based systems, Perception enhancement, Driver
vehicle status monitoring, others, and in the Autonomous
variety and the cooperative in-vehicle-infrastructure variety.
In the columns, the corresponding infrastructural (mainly
classic), measures are listed. Some examples are: obstacle
free zone, rumble strips, reflecting road markings, protective
shoulder.
The main intention of this method was to give an over-
view of the scenario distribution to the safety measures.
Since one scenario can supplement more than one safety
measure either on the in-vehicle or the infrastructural side,
multiple mentions of one scenario can be found. The main
focus is here on the crossing points, on the co-operative
systems.
Even if the focus is on co-operative systems, autonomous
system measures have been kept to provide a comparison
between all measures during the further process. To reduce
the amount of measures for further evaluation the measures
have been consolidated.
The detailed results of the safety analysis will be reported
elsewhere at a later stage.
The figure shows how new ideas for systems can be
devised according to the combination of infrastructural
measures and ADAS measures. For instance: vision en-
hancement systems having the same functionality as already
existing reflecting road markings in the infrastructure (for
alternative A: road curvature informing at adverse weather
conditions). Alternatively, we can also see how vision en-
hancement systems could help in tunnels, or protecting
shoulders.
3.5 Selection of 18 alternatives
For the six errors, it was decided to commence with
three alternatives to account for every error: in-vehicle,
infrastructural, and co-operative vehicle-infrastructural
alternatives [12].
Countermeasures for each error were described and each










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Eur. Transp. Res. Rev. (2012) 4:67–77 73
measure the focus in terms of driver’s experience (skill),
age, owner and type of vehicle, and the (road) environment
(traffic density, road category, special sections, lighting con-
dition, and weather) were defined. In total there were 35
subcategories.
Error 1: Driving too fast in an unexpected bend on rural
roads
1. In-vehicle measure: (Unexpected) sharp bends are
registered in a digital map of the navigation-system
and presented to the driver.
2. Infrastructural measure: The vehicle is “analysed”
and a Variable Message Sign (VMS) signalises dan-
ger, depending on the measured speed
3. Co-operative system measure: Electronic beacons
give additional information on displays in the car
about the road, e.g. warning ‘too fast’, because of
local circumstances (weather, etc.), and not only on
electronic displays above the road. (this also enable
adjusting the language of the information according
to requirements of the driver). All three measures
have a focus on rural roads
Error 2: Speeding
1. In-vehicle measure: a speed alert system in the vehi-
cle by camera based posted speed sign recognition
2. Infrastructural measure: Speed limit is set under
consideration of special environmental circumstan-
ces and is presented to the driver on a VMS
3. Co-operative system measure: Speed alert based on
digital maps that contain legal speed limits, envi-
ronmental input by electronic beacons
Error 3: Wrong use of road
1. In-vehicle measure: a camera based Lane Departure
Warning System (LDWS)
2. Infrastructural measure: audible lane delineation
(“rumble line”)
3. Co-operative system measure: Adaptive LDWS: the
sensitivity of Lane Departure Warning System is
adapted in special conditions, such as road works,
or in tunnels
Error 4: Violation of priority rules
1. In-vehicle measure: posted traffic sign recognition
(camera based)
Table 6 The alternative solutions for error 3. Wrong use of lane (error 3). Resulting in: Accidents due to lane departure
Problem Alternative Scenario Technology Communication
type
The LDWSystem is deactivated
at the beginning of long




Rural, Highway, all drivers








on an UMTS terrestrial radio




Constructions the driver is








Rural, Highway, all drivers
all vehicles all traffic
conditions
Digital maps/GPS—speed,
ldentity and indicator use
system, Car-to-car
communication via physical
and link-layer based on an
UMTS terrestrial radio access




Intelligent edge lines (triggered
by vehicle turn indicator)
showing a the right way to a
vehicle exiting the motorway
in case of impaired visibility.
H. Light sensitive sensors
(solar cells based) will
help the driver to see
the edge and centre
lines
Rural, all drivers all vehicles
all traffic conditions—
running light inserted in
road surface- all weather
esp. reduced visibility
Light sensitive sensors (solar
cells based)
Vehicle→ Infra
In case of inattention the driver
is drifting off the lane
I. CCDa camera, LDW
system to detect unintended
lane departure and warn
the driver
Rural, Highway, all drivers
all vehicles all traffic
conditions roads without
rumble lines
CCD camera, LDW system:
virtual rumble strips
Infra → Vehicle





Assistant is adapted in
special conditions,
Rural, Highway, all drivers,
all vehicles, special traffic
conditions and roads
without hard shoulder
Communication with the local
infrastructure, LDW
Infra → Vehicle
a CCD: A charge-coupled device (CCD) is an analog shift register that enables the transportation of analog signals controlled by a clock signal. The
camera contains a chip device and no film.
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2. Infrastructural measure: traffic signs (stop sign, ap-
proach priority road sign)
3. Co-operative system measure: traffic light status
emitted to the car
The focus of the co-operative system is on dense
traffic (e.g. large lorry in front obstructing view on
traffic light) and on adverse weather conditions.
Error 5: Overtaking failure
1. In-vehicle measure: blind spot detector indicating
that one is being overtaken
2. Infrastructural measure: separation of lanes by rum-
ble strips where overtaking is not allowed
3. Co-operative system measure: a co-operative sys-
tem warning for oncoming vehicles by vehicle-to-
vehicle communication
Error 6: Insufficient safety distance
1. In-vehicle measure: a frontal warning system (e.g.
radar based)
2. Infrastructural measure: VMS fog warning
3. Co-operative system measure: adaptive frontal
warning systems: the sensitivity of the system is
dynamically adapted on the basis of local (e.g.
weather) circumstances.
3.6 Estimation of potential of safety effects
One of the major criteria defining the safety benefit of a
measure was the contribution that each scenario makes to
the goal of avoiding or mitigating negative consequences of
driving errors. By analysing the accidents, it could be esti-
mated how many of these historical accidents have been
caused by errors that could theoretically be addressed by the
discussed scenario [13]. But usually not all of the accidents
that theoretically can be addressed by a new scenario will be
really avoided after implementation. Therefore an assump-
tion on the proportion “avoidable accident” must be done as
well.
In order to make these assumptions the possible condi-
tions of a later implementation must be described. The
answers to the following question will set the “boundaries”
of a scenario:
– If the measure needs equipment in vehicles how many
of the vehicles might be equipped with the system?
– If the measure is informative (not “overruling”) how
many drivers might follow the recommendations?
– If the measure is not addressing ALL drivers equally
which type of drivers should be addressed?
– etc.
To answer these kind of questions more specific
information was required on driver, vehicle, traffic and
environmental conditions. There are a number of (deci-
sive) criteria that have a strong influence and need to be
specified. Some are typically important for the drivers,
others are more important for the society as a whole
(public authorities), and others are important for manu-
facturers. Amongst these criteria are comfort, investment
and user costs, technical readiness, et cetera (eSafety
Forum).
3.7 Multiple criteria analysis
The MCA methodology as an evaluation approach has a
long tradition and has its roots in operational research (OR)
[2]. More recently, it has been applied in the context of
economics-driven project evaluation.
MCA allows comparing a number of actions (for
instance, projects or policy measures), or alternatives in
terms of specific criteria. These criteria represent the
operationalization of the objectives and sub-objectives
of decision makers and stakeholders participating in the
decision-making process. The MCA methodology is es-
pecially useful to structure complex decision problems
according to their constituent parts (objectives, sub-
objectives as measured by criteria), to make comparisons
among project alternatives. This approach appears espe-
cially useful when effects cannot be fully monetised, nor
even quantified. It is usually possible to link specific
stakeholders with specific criteria in the MCA, and by
doing so stakeholder management can effectively be
implemented, as described in Macharis et al [6].
Central in the MCA procedure is the assessment of the
relative weights of a set of criteria contributing to forgiving
road and self-explaining road environments. For this pur-
pose, a twostep procedure was followed. First, a special
workshop1 with leading experts coming from INSAFETY
consortium partners was organised. At the end of this work-
shop, the experts agreed on a decision tree as presented in
Fig. 4.
The top level of the decision tree shown in Fig. 4 repre-
sents the focus or overall objective, namely creating benefits
by making the road environment more forgiving and more
self-explaining. At the second level, three groups of main
stakeholders are shown, namely (1) the users, (2) society/
public policy makers and (3) manufacturers. Within each
group of stakeholders, a number of subcategories could be
identified such as drivers, fleet owners and emergency
centres (for the main category ‘users’), road managers and
1 This workshop took place at the Technical University of Delft
(TUDelft), on 6 and 7 February 2006 and welcomed experts from the
Bundesanstallt für Strassenwezen (BAST), this is the German Federal
Highway Research Institute, the Technical University of Darmstatt
(TUDarm), the University of Stuttgart (USTUTT) and the TUDelft itself.
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authorities (for the main category ‘authorities’) and car
manufacturers, equipment manufacturers, system providers
and content providers (for the main category ‘manufac-
turers’). As regards these subcategories, it turned out that
it was not necessary to include them as separate groups,
since the preferences of these subgroups were not substan-
tially different from each other and since some of these
subgroups were not organised in such a way so as to exert
a substantial influence on policy making. At the third level,
the criteria are listed that these main stakeholders consider
relevant. At the lowest level, the alternatives are shown that
need to be prioritised. Please refer to De Brucker et al (2007)
for detailed results.
3.8 Prioritisation of scenarios
The results showed that, for the public authorities, preferred
safety measures are characterised by minimal infrastructural
investments, and “speeding measures” considered the most
important. For users, “too fast in unexpected bends”, for
manufacturers: violation of priority rules. Manufacturers
preferred safety measures with minimal investment for the
vehicles.
4 Discussion and conclusions
The methodology which was adopted showed the follow-
ing strengths and weaknesses. To start from the accident
analysis data, in this case from the German accident data,
there is a sound basis for selection of FOR and SER
environments. However, investigating safety measures,
we could see that there is an emphasis on measures that
can be applied in rural and motorway environment, rath-
er than urban environments. The safety hazards and the
measures for vulnerable road users were under repre-
sented. For this reason, it was decided in the In-Safety
project to select also measures for vulnerable road users,
in particular school children. Furthermore, the list of
possible safety measures is not exhaustive. In the In-
Safety project, focus was mainly on measures that are
not too far away from the market. More innovative
measures could be imagined, and should be developed.
The safety assessment of measures that did not exist, on
the basis of resemblance to infrastructural measures is a
viable option. At a later stage in the project, also data
from modelling activities and pilot site evaluations can
be used for assessment of safety effects.
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Fig. 4 Decision hierarchy for the prioritisation of FOR and SER alternatives
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The Multiple Criteria Analysis shows that the different
stakeholders will prefer different types of safety measures.
Public authorities should be aware of this, and develop
policy actions to cover for the problems the industry and
the road users will experience in case of a safety measure
which does pose serious disadvantages for them.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Crea-
tive Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution
and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
source are credited.
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